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The same thing happened in 1956 in our presidential 
primary between Kefauver and Stevenson. . .. In poli-
tics, you usually beat yourself, you don't get defeated, 
. . . especially when you're in office." (The Red River 
Scene, Nov. 14, 1966). This statement, in general, ex-
presses my own views of the election of 1966. 
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Democracy on Trial in Asia 
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University of Minnesota, Morris 
ABSTRACT - A study of the feasibility of democracy in the developing nations in Asia. The prem-
ise of this study is that the Asian concept of democracy is not tantamount to the Anglo-American 
counterpart. The vorious types of democracy that exist in the new nations of Asia today are, in 
fact, alternative to Western democracy and are hardly democracy at all. Rather, they are au-
thoritarian regimes. The emerging nations of Asia are at the threshold of political modernization, 
and such contingency can be met by a particular socio-political system. The authoritarian regimes 
of Asia are such systems in point. The requisites of democracy are not yet readily available in the 
developing nations of Asia and authoritarianism appears as a symptom of the birth of new na-
tions from old societies. However, the present rejection of democracy in Asia does not necessarily 
mean that democracy will not be feasible in Asia in the future. 
'Jhe record of nation-building in twentieth-century 
Asia seems to commence with a chapter on the establish-
ment of authoritarianism, despite our firm conviction 
that democracy is the best form of political system for 
all nations and that popular government will ultimately 
triumph over dictatorial government. In most Asian 
emerging nations, many of the paraphernalia of democracy 
ended with forms devoid of substance. Representative 
governments have more frequently failed than succeeded 
to grow and bear fruits. The political culture of Asia does 
not seem to provide the Asians with a fertile ground for 
democratic institutions. What makes the lure of authori-
tarianism so forceful and the appeal of democracy so 
powerless in Asia? This question requires us to analyze 
the feasibility of democracy in the developing nations of 
Asia. 
Social Setting of Asian Developing Nations 
and the Requisites of Effective Democracy 
Asiatic society is basically what Wittfogel (1963: 8 
and passim) referred to as "hydraulic society" and "ag-
romanagerial or agrobureaucratic society." These soci-
eties are featured by social conservatism, extreme lo-
calism, and fairly rigid local structures. Traditionally 
Oriental societies were accustomed to the despotic 
strength of political authority. In such rigidly stratified 
agrarian societies, the strength of a nation was often 
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based on patriotic feeling of the people and on the sta-
bility founded upon ancient traditions. Social structure 
mainly consisted of a handful of aristocrats, who were 
land owners, artisans, bureaucrats, and the rest of the 
population, the majority of whom were the peasantry. 
The first was in a predominant position to exert influ-
ence whereas the last was not represented. Unlike a 
property-bound, individualistic Western society, there-
fore, the tradition-bound, family-based Oriental society 
has experienced for the past centuries autocratic political 
heritages in which the real political power is oriented by 
politicians rather than by the grass roots. As Kautsky 
( 1962: 19) pointed out, politics in such a society is "the 
only road to prestige and high social position, apart from 
the limited opportunities sometimes provided by the re-
ligious hierarchy." 
In such traditional Asiatic nations, democratic aspira-
tions do not seem to have materialized. Democracy can 
be instituted and maintained when there are both ac-
cessible elites and available population, and when diverse 
interests of society can be sufficiently ba'lanced and repre-
sented through the political process. Modern democracy 
requires a social system that Kornhauser (1959: 39) de-
fined as a mass society "in which elites are readily ac-
cessible to influence by non-elites and non-elites are 
readily available for mobilization by elites." Such a mass 
society, in turn, must be composed of an educated and 
fairly prosperous electorate without concentration of 
wealth; social classes without bitter, religious, and sec-
tional antagonisms; and a pluralistic society in which 
many private loyalties and associations can prosper; with 
all tending to buttress the principles and goals of de-
mocracy. 
The Minnesota Academy of Science 
The traditional Asiatic society, however, does not pro-
vide such a syndrome of conditions for effective democ-
racy. What if the Asian states of today were modernized? 
Could they then meet the requisites of democracy? His-
tory has witnessed in the mid-twentieth century, that 
most Asian states are still reluctant to accept democracy 
in practice. Why does democracy fail in Asia today? 
Above all, it has failed in the "rice eating" quarters of 
the world because it does not produce satisfactory re-
sults. Within the Asiatic institutional framework, de-
mocracy has been unable to supply effective political in-
stitutions for the peoples. 
In most Asian states, modern society is not yet char-
acterized by the Western standards of modernity, such as, 
the comparatively high degree of urbanization, relatively 
high per capita income, extensive geographical and so-
cial mobility, penetrative networks of mass communica-
tion media, widespread literacy, and widespread partici-
pation and involvement by members of the society in 
modern social and economic processes. 1 Although the 
nations are striving for modernization, the vast majority 
of their populations still live in villages in a state of ex-
treme poverty, and follow a primitive agriculture. A few 
cities of the Orient are as modern as any modern cities 
can be, but the rural poverty and backwardness a few 
miles away are without equal. 
Furthermore, the Asians face the problems of adjust-
ment to the nuclear age with medieval confusions and 
contradictions. They are anxious to bridge the gap of 
centuries in a few decades. It is a painful and hazardous 
transition period - they must, at the same time, try to 
solve the age-old problems of expanding population, 
shortage of food resources, overflowing social maladies 
stemming from the rapidly changing society, and ever-
growing problems of unemployment. In addition, Asian 
states must overcome the frustrations inherent in the 
vacuum that develops when ancient regimes collapse 
without being replaced by a new order (Dean, 1957). 
The new states in Asia have to face the problems of the 
new era into which they were thrust without an adequate 
political and administrative organization, without essen-
tial skills and technical equipment, and also without a 
social preparation that could release the energies of the 
community to dea} with the problems of transformation. 
Since the traditional society has been battered, public 
morality destroyed, and religious belief shaken, what 
the people have been left with is poverty, corruption, and 
the days of sweat and tears in the midst of confusion 
and distress. A wide gap appears between the traditional 
mass and the Westernized elite. Stability is hard to main-
tain in such a transition period, and it is much more diffi-
cult to build the delicate mechanisms of the democratic 
process. 
Can democracy rush in to rescue the Asians from this 
catastrophe? Of course, it can, but it is very unlikely that 
democracy will flourish or endure in the immediate fu-
ture in Asian nations because democracy requires a proc-
1 For further details, see various measuring yardsticks of 
modernity discussed in Almond and Coleman ( 1960) , Geertz 
(1963), and Panikkar (1959) . 
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ess of maturation that is perhaps too slow to satisfy the 
hasty expectations of the Asians. To most of the Asians, 
the immediate problem is not industrialization, urbaniza-
tion, increase of national wealth , or reform of education-
al systems, but searches for stability and leadership. 
Asian politics deals with personalities rather than pro-
grams. Like Nietzsche's last men, the Asians are seek-
ing a charismatic leader whose personality, in the eyes 
of his people, will have a more than human endowment, 
a touch of divine grace and special wisdom ( e.g. Nehru, 
Ayub Khan, Sukarno, Mao Tse-tung, Syngman Rhee, 
etc.). In most Asian states, therefore, the choice of po-
litical systems hinges upon the stability a government 
promises its people. In extreme cases of national under-
development, people do not really care whether they 
have a democracy or a totalitarian government as long as 
it provides them with security. To these people, democ-
racy is even regarded as a luxury. They cannot afford to 
tolerate the possible defects of democracy, such as dead-
lock in the legislature because of the obstructionism of a 
political party, and the existence of an unorganized elec-
torate controlled by well-organized political agitators . In 
fact, political parties themselves often become sources of 
schisms. The multi-party system exists in name only and 
the one-party system prevails in reality. Neither parlia-
ments nor cabinets seem to represent the people's inter-
ests; they are controlled by the party in power - more 
precisely by its leader. The new class of political elite 
operates without guidance from and a responsibility to 
constituencies. Thus, openly aired conflict is the accepted 
price of democracy. Insofar as there exist poverty-strick-
en masses living on a margin of existence, low level of 
national income and education, and an elongated pyra-
mid class structure, the prognosis for the perpetuation of 
political democracy in Asia is bleak and dismal. 
Democracy cannot prosper in a society that is based 
on outmoded science and obsolete technology. On the 
other hand, scientific work cannot progress in a vacuum. 
Without the increase of wealth from the creation of in-
dustries, all ideas of democracy are nothing but vain 
dreams. In eagerness for modernization, however, many 
states in Asia hastily undermine the process of indus-
trialization that is so invaluable to democratization of so-
ciety. They try to choose a short cut to modernization by 
securing effective political leadership. In doing so, they 
frequently mistake their dreams and aspirations for their 
national ideologies, and, in the long run , they expect de-
mocracy to achieve the unachievable. Democracy is not 
achieved by acts of will alone. Perhaps, democracy may 
be the effective and proper form of political system for 
Asian states in the future, but not presently. Thus, the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of democracy have been 
challenged and democracy per se has become a catch 
word for an impractical form of political system. 
Authoritarianism Alternative of Democracy 
Based on Nationalist and Socialist Symbiosis 
In the Asian political scene, therefore, the so-called 
"revolution of rising expectations" of Asian nations does 
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not tolerate a political system that cannot cope with their 
hopes that "someone will usher in a kingdom of God 
which will immediately end their suffering" (McCord, 
1965 :41). To most Asian nations, time is short and the 
desire for modernization is strong. Unless emergency 
measures are taken, the gap between desire and reality 
will widen further with the passage of time. The problem 
of political progress does not lie in realizing replicas of 
Western institutions but in discovering political forces 
that expedite the process of modernization. In such a 
case, there exists "a dilemma of choice between the ex-
tent of pluralistic freedom they can afford and the pace 
of development they can achieve" (Lowenthal, 1964: 
203ff.). 
If we follow Organski's ( 1965) classification of the 
stages of political development,2 the majority of Asian 
nations are still in the stage of the politics of primitive 
unification or at the threshold of the politics of industrial-
ization. They are still far from the stages of the politics 
of national welfare and the politics of abundance. Many 
of the twentieth-century Asian nations are featured by 
the characteristics of the nations in their era of nation-
building, that is, by the search for national identity and 
unity. Some that have passed this stage of development 
are now striving for the era of industrial modernization 
that is markedly characterized by their eagerness to ac-
cumulate capital. Yet, seldom have the Asian nations 
reached the maturity of growth necessary for the welfare 
state, which is concerned with the protection of the citi-
zens rather than with capital, let alone for the age of 
automation, in which increased productivity of the auto-
mated system promises economic abundance. 
For their political stages, a particular socio-political 
system is useful for the Asian nations. A fairly decentral-
ized, pluralistic, reconciliation system may not be suit-
able as a conversion system, whereas a centralized, coer-
cive, mobilization system is more practical and profitable. 
Apter (1965: 379) aptly described the mobilization 
system. 
Mobilization systems utilize hierarchical struc-
tures of authority, ... Authority derives from the 
mobilized public, as embodied in some particu-
lar instrumentality of the state, such as the single 
party or the army, within which the functions of 
government center on a single political 'leader. H a 
mobilization system has hierarchical authority and 
a high degree of consummatory values, each act ac-
quires a sacred significance. More important , the 
goals of the leaders come to be endowed with these 
consummatory values. The effects are the stimulation 
of the population to great efforts, the development of 
their creativity and sense of excitement, and the lib-
eration and ennoblement of individuals. 
Omnivorously, such a system lays the foundation 
of autocratic regimes as the sine qua non of political 
modernization. 
2 For the study of political development, Organski's book and 
von der Mehden's book ( 1964) are extremely useful. The 
former analyzes the stages of a nation's development vertically 
from historical perspective and the latter examines horizontally 
the developmental patterns of the 84 emerging nations. 
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Thus, authoritarian regimes emerge as unique types of 
new institutions to modify Western liberal democracy. In 
the transitional period of nation building, political oscil-
lation is at its peak. The transition from the traditional 
Asiatic society to the modern libertarian society cannot 
be made at once. To the new nations of Asia, the choice 
is not between traditional and modern society but entails 
what Millikan and Blackmer (1961: 98) have called " a 
third choice": 
the gradual modification of the institutions, prac-
tices, and structure of the traditional society in the 
direction of modernization while retaining some of 
its traditional cohesive features. 
For this middle path, the modernizing autocracy has 
an ideological appeal. It lies at various points between 
democracy and totalitarianism. Certainly, it has not 
drifted toward the abyss of the sacred-collectivity part 
nor has it attempted to cling to the secular-libertarian 
part of the continuum. The new nations of Asia rejected 
these two extremes of the continuum by choosing the 
half-way point, that is , authoritarianism that, according 
to Ebenstein (1962: 14) "denies its subjects the freedom 
and responsibility of political choice and action, while 
still leaving them some degree of freedom and self-ex-
pression in non-political matters." 
For the prime urgency of nation-building, what these 
pattern of authority that is characterized by the use of tra-
dition to validate current practice. Perhaps, a well planned 
change of tradition may be made, but neither a wholesale 
change nor a complete destruction of tradition is at-
tempted, that is, the solidarity of plural subgroups rather 
than the totalitarianization of a regime is the goal. An 
authoritarian state does not attempt the atomization and 
isolation of the individual, and it seldom brings forth the 
total synchronization of all social organizations to make 
them serviceable to the state. ~ On the other hand, an au-
thoritatarian state does not follow the typical pattern of 
stable Western democracies either. As Lipset ( I 959 : 
101) precisely pointed out, the political setting of Asia 
is diametrically different from that of Europe: 
In Europe at the beginning of modern politics, the 
workers were faced with the problem of winning citi-
zenship, the right to take part in the political game, 
from the dominant aristocratic and business strata 
who controlled politics. In Asia the long-term pres-
ence of colonial rulers has identified conservatism as 
an ideology and the more well-to-do classes with sub-
servience to colonialism; while, leftist ideologies, 
usually of a Marxist variety, have been dominant, be-
ing identified with nationalism , .. The left in the 
European stable democracies grew gradually in a fight 
for more democracy, and gave expression to the dis-
contents involved in early industrialization, while the 
right retained the support of traditionalist elements in 
the society, until eventually the system came into an 
easy balance between a modified left and right. In 
Asia, the left is in power during the period of popula-
3 For the characteristics of totalitarian dictatorship, see Fried-
rich and Bryzinski ( 1961 :9ff. ) and Neumann ( 1964 :243-247). 
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lion explosion and early industrialization, and must 
accept responsibility for all the consequent miseries. 
In mid-twentieth century Western politics, the tradi-
tional demarcation line between the left and right has 
become more subtle and separation per se is no longer 
vitally important; most of the Western democracies have 
reached the maturity-stage of their political develop-
ments, thus finding themselves "in a 'post-politics' phase 
- that is, there is relatively little difference between the 
democratic left and right, the socialists are moderates, 
and the conservatives accept the welfare state" (Lipset, 
1963:82). The newly developing nations of Asia, how-
ever, are still in the infancy of political development, and 
this situation requires intense political controversy and 
ideology. 
Political ideology has been particularly useful for 
Asian states, especially in consensus building and in the 
creation of political fantasy. In the period of the search 
f?~ national identity, when all the political, social, re-
!1g1ous, and economical problems are unsettled, political 
ideology can provide a reservoir of political forces for 
them. During this period, these societies have to under-
take the acculturation process and it will likely plunge 
the people ~nto confusion; in such a transitional society, 
"the scene 1s set for the prophet, for the ideological re-
former" (Pye, 1962:288). Among the various shades of 
poJitical convictions and ideologies in these societies 
nationalism and socialism stand out. Both of these ideol~ 
ogies have been used as both political beliefs and politi-
cal tools. 
Nationalism in these newly born nations usually con-
veys connotations of a striving for national independence 
by forming a national unity centered around national 
consciousness. To those nations that were under colonial-
ism, the desire of people to get rid of alien rulers incor-
porates primordial loyalties and sentiment based on race 
language, tribe, etc. In Asian societies where popula; 
consensus is generally low, nationalism served as a me-
dium to maintain unity and solidarity among people. In 
the meantime, the leadership roles of national move-
ments were taken by the intellectuals who, in turn, were 
responsible for modernization, industrialization, and the 
grand task of nation building. To these intellectuals, 
some of the most urgent problems were elimination of 
poverty, aristocratic rule, and foreign rule. Naturally, the 
ideological-organizational structure of socialism and 
communism provides potential means of modernization. 
Furthermore, such ideologies fit comfortably into the 
Asian tradition of the tutelage of the elite and the educa-
tive state. Frustration and resentment over the status quo 
and desire for rapid change made the Asian intellectuals 
believe in the scientific truth of Marxism as a philosophy 
of hope. Such intellectuals are often "deeply sincere, 
deadly serious men in whom burns an inner fire. They 
have, generally, a high level of integrity, dedication, and 
purpose" (Scalapino, 1965:7). In most of the Asian 
states, therefore, socialism has been another name for 
nationalism. In such nations, the political development 
has been driven by a "dialectic" of political process be-
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tween nationalism and socialism (Apter, 1964:26-28). 
Usually, in the pre-independence period, socialism is a 
force behind the independence movement and backs it 
up by means of furnishing an ideology with a revolution-
ary theme to a new group of political entrepreneurs. In 
the independence period, socialism is in the fore of pop-
ular movements and nationalism is rather a latent sup-
porting force; in the post-independence period, however, 
socialism often loses its leading role with the appearance 
of ruling groups and nationalism. Thus, an authoritarian 
regime eventually appears on the basis of a nationalism 
and socialism symbiosis - nationalist socialism in which 
class struggle is not significant:1 
This ruling person or ruling group of persons enact 
what Apter (1965: 324ff.) called "The Robin Hood 
Role," which "arises during the period of political fan-
tasy, which is also a period of rule confusion. It is filled 
by role-testers - individuals who, by defining their roles 
a bit larger than life, encourage others to follow suit." 
The leaders of these countries, although they may differ 
in adopting the appropriate methods of reaching their 
goals, are the same in that they employ ideologies that 
give expression to common feelings of their people in the 
past, present, and future. It is because of this reason that 
many of the Asian leaders' intentions are expressed in 
humanistic tones. As Sigmund, Jr. (1963 :41) put it, 
"Asian philosophy and political practice emphasize con-
ciliation in the resolution of conflict by the attempt to 
stress common elements in conflicting views and to 
achieve a consensus as a basis for policy." In other 
words, political ideologies in emerging nations begin as 
the force behind popular movements and frequently end 
as serviceable tools for political leaders. 
A cursory examination of ideologies in the new na-
tions in the Orient presents the interesting finding that 
various types of democracy exist there: the "guided de-
mocracy" of Sukarno and King Mahendra," the "basic 
democracy" of Ayub Khan,6 the "true democracy" of U 
Nu, the "new democracy" of Mao Tse-tung, the "con-
trolled democracy" of Nehru, the "partyless democracy" 
of Narayan, and Badarnaike's "substance of democracy" 
and "modified democracy for emergency" in South Korea 
and South Viet Nam. By and large, all these versions of 
democracy are Asian alternatives to Anglo-American 
democracy. Stated in different terms, such democracy is 
hardly democracy at all to the Western eyes. 
In essence, Sukarno's guided democracy is an ideology 
that is broad enough to accommodate nationalism, inter-
nationalism, democracy, social justice, and religious ele-
ments. It calls for "guidance from above and a consensus 
'This type of ideology is the predominant pattern of Asia. 
It is certainly influenced by the Marxist interpretation of capi-
talism and the Leninist views on imperialism, but it does not 
accept the entire Marxist-Leninist theory as the goals of action. 
Neo-Maoism, for instance, is more interested in industrialization 
under the authoritarian and/ or totalitarian leaders than in the 
championship of the lower class as the victor of class struggle. 
' ·Tutelage democracy" in accordance with Shits' typology 
(Shi ls , 1962 : 60-66) . 
• ''Modernizing oligarchy" according to James Coleman 
(Almond and Coleman)) (1960:562-565). 
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achieved through discussion" ( von der Mehden, I 964: 
129) . In his lecture to the students of Hasanuddin Uni-
versity, Sukarno explained the system of musjawarah 
and mufakat ( discussion and agreement). 
Regarding our own democracy, I initiated the idea, 
calling on the people to join to fight the diseases 
that were the results of free-mght liberalism .... I 
want this guided democracy to become the proper-
ty of the Indonesian people again .... Think, carry 
it out so that as a joint result we can achieve a new 
democratic system which I call democracy with 
leadership, or guided democracy, which is suitable 
for conditions in Indonesia . ... ( Sigmund, 1963: 
62) 
Ayub Khan's basic democracy also is a system of lo-
cal government with a mixture of elected and appointed 
representatives. It is an outright challenge to the Anglo-
Saxon political system. 
The concept of Basic Democracy intends to resolve 
all the conflicts which had been introduced in the 
body-politic by the British during their sojourn in 
India through the various institutions implanted by 
them such as parliamentary democracy, the pyram-
idal bureaucracy, the ineffective judiciary and the 
Anglo-Saxon legal system, the functional educational 
system and the class conflicts of the bourgoisie, the 
proletariat and that perpetual orphan, the peasantry 
(Khan, 1960:49). 
Ayub Khan (Sigmund, 1963: 114) himself delin-
eated the nature of basic democracy: 
To my mind, there are four prerequisites for the 
success of any democratic system in a country like 
Pakistan: 
1. It should be simple to understand, easy to work, 
and cheap to sustain. 
2. It should put to the voter only such questions as 
he can answer in the light of his own personal 
knowledge and understanding without external 
prompting. 
3. It should ensure the effective participation of all 
citizens in the affairs of the country up to the 
level of their mental horizon and intellectual cali-
ber. 
4. It should be able to produce reasonably strong 
and stable governments. 
Nehru's Controlled democracy was based on parlia-
mentary government and universal adult franchise . It 
was supposedly accountable to the people and to their 
representatives. Nonetheless, India's democracy hardly 
provides the democratic principles of rotation in office 
in India. The most fundamental problem of Indian de-
mocracy is well expressed in Ray's apprehension on its 
future when he stated, "Centrifugal forces always seem 
to prevail in India. If people cannot observe discipline 
and maintain the unity of the country, the enforced dis-
cipline may come from military dictatorship or even from 
external authorities" ( Ray, 1960: 136) . 
The new democracy of Mao Tse-tung has not identified 
itself with the so-called formula-Marxism and it contends 
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that the "socialistic revolution" - construction of new de-
mocracy - should be preceded by the "democratic revolu-
tion" - destruction of imperialism and feudalism. By es-
pousing Chinese nationalism to an Asiatic form of Marx-
ism, Mao's Chinese policies reflect the common aspira-
tions of the developing nations. Nevertheless, Mao's "new 
democracy" as an antithesis of "old democracy" is totali-
tarian dictatorship and it necessarily retreats from democ-
racy in the Western sense. Mao's attempt to Sinify Marx-
ism appeared in his report to the Sixth Plenum of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in 1938. 
Today's China is an outgrowth of historic China. 
We are Marxist historicists; we must not mutilate 
history. From Confucius to Sun Yat-sen we must 
sum it up critically, and we must constitute ourselves 
the heirs of all that is precious in this past . . . A 
Communist is a Marxist internationalist, but Marx-
ism must take on a national form before it can be 
applied (Schram, 1963 :57). 
To sum up, all the various types of democracy claimed by 
the new nations of Asia promise in fact a political system 
of authoritarianism. In Gibson's words, "Most of the lead-
ers of the new states feel that they are not yet ready for 
Western-style democracy. Most of them also reject totali-
tarianism" ( Gibson, 1964: 262). 
The birth of authoritarianism in Asia also reflects the 
backwardness of economic development in that region. 
These modernizing autocracies are natural solutions to the 
dilemmas of economic development, such as problems of 
capital accumulation, agricultural reforms, and industrial-
ization. Most of the countries have not yet reached what 
Rostow termed the "take-off" stage of economic develop-
ment. 7 Yet they always aspire after the affluent society. 
Such aspirations for new patterns of economic life cannot 
be satisfied for the people unless a drastic change occurs 
on the level and in the modes of organization of economic 
systems. The transformation from traditional status to self-
sufficiency of an agrarian environment that lacks many 
special technologies available in a modern industrial so-
ciety requires considerable organization adaptation and 
mobilization of human resources. For such economic en-
terprise, democracy seems to be unfit and, in effect, seems 
to undermine speedy industrialization by retarding the 
momentum of economic development. Consequently, new 
nations of Asia turn to authoritarianism for this reason 
also. 
• As to the "take-off" concept, there are conflicting opinions 
among scholars. Some doubt the guarantee of self-sustained 
stage of economic development , and others are suspicious 
predictions of the circumstances under which this stage of 
growth occurs. I use this concept , following Rostow's definition: 
"(a) a rise in the rate of productive investment from (say) 
5 per cent or less to over IO per cent of national income ( or 
net national product); ( b) the development of one or more 
substantial manufacturing sectors, with a high rate of growth; 
(c) the existence or quick emergence of a political, social and 
institutional frame work which exploits the impulses to expan-
sion in the modern sector and the potential external economy 
effects of the take-off and gives to growth an on-going char-
acter." (Rostow, 1962:284) 
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The Make-up of Authoritarianism: It's raison d'etre 
Once democracy is identified with an unworkable politi-
cal system in Asia, a tight authoritarian direction is be-
lieved more likely to make present-day poor societies 
richer than an open, competitive, liberal democracy. So-
ciety is overburdened by poverty, and dictatorship looms 
on the horizon as a symptom of the birth of new nations 
from old societies. The general trend of Asian society is 
directed toward centralism. That means, as we have seen, 
that Asian social characteristics favor either authoritarian 
rule of the small elite class or one-man dictatorship backed 
by popular support, because an Oriental society is, in gen-
eral, divided between a large impoverished mass and a 
small favored elite. More often than not, democracy is 
identified with corruption - "bribery," "election-rigging," 
"vote buying," "favoritism," "factions," and "rotation of 
political power among elite members," and so on. 
National politics in these nations frequently operates in 
the name of democracy to seize some profit from a mo-
mentary combination of favorable circumstances. Political 
parties degenerate into factional strife and corruption, and 
rational policy-making is also impeded, for decisions tend 
to be compromises based on the relative strength of the 
factions rather than on objective factors. Politicians switch 
loyalties frequently. In most Asian countries, a corrupt 
government can remain in power if it has strong points to 
offset the corruption, but the mass of people are still the 
victims of such a society. In fact, such a government loses 
touch with the masses and regards all opposition as treason 
and all criticism against the government as sedition . When 
the oppression and corruption of a government reach a 
breaking point, and when the deterioration of society and 
the sterility of the government reveal their ugly realities, 
then the masses, facing death from either poverty or op-
pression, revolt against the government. 
First of all, religion comes in to protect the masses from 
their powerlessness and insecurity. People rely on supra-
personal power to escape their distress. Thus, the political 
implications of the religions are enormous in Asia. Some 
"moral issues" in politics, such as prohibition, vice con-
trol, and "political issues" - civilian rule against military 
rule , and peace against war - are related to the ethics and 
faiths of religions. Thus, efforts to relate religions to poli-
tics appear in the Asian political scene. Through religions, 
many Asians find new warmth and the meaning of com-
munity at a deeper level. The authority of religion is a sub-
ject of great importance in its relation to tradition. When 
religious faith is equated with what we may call "political 
morality" and when it becomes so preoccupied with means 
that loses sight of ends, church religion turns into political 
religion. Political messianism of religions, in turn, pro-
duces militant mass organizations with a moral purpose. 
It is why religion and politics become two separate ideol-
ogies that are in competition but continue to co-exist, each 
representing powerful institutional forces. In nations 
where social institutions, especially law and custom, have 
the sanction of religion and are considered a part of re-
ligious life, there is an inevitable conflict between religions 
and the changing nature of the society ( e.g., Hinduism, 
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Islam, etc.). Religion as an asset in cementing the struggle 
of nationalism against foreign rule can easily become the 
sentinel of the civil coup with l' esprit d' armee against the 
corrupted government. Especially Buddhism in Asia is 
making its most vigorous, most open attempt to seize tem-
poral power ( see Soka Gakkai in Japan and Buddhism in 
Southeast Asia). 
Secondly, the intelligentsia with high education and 
mastery of technical skills may lead the masses against the 
corrupted political power. In the politics of the new states 
of Asia, intellectuals occupy a prominent position - vir-
tually, they are in a position to create the political life of 
their countries. Being exposed to the set course of modern 
culture and education, they bear responsibilities for setting 
their countries on their feet. This, in turn, means the high 
degree of political involvement of the intellectual. General-
ly, intellectuals are men of ideas rather than men of action 
and often lack the organization and power necessary to 
seize control and reshape the society. They are vulnerable 
to popular sentiments and are more reformers than revo-
lutionaries. ' 
Students emerge from the political and economic Dark 
Age that lies over the Asian continent as modernizing 
youth. They are becoming qualified to act as the moving 
force of the center of society and they are identified as a 
group that upholds civic virtue. Today, however, the Asian 
youth confronts all the frustrating situations - the burning 
desires of the youth are quenched by harsh treatment of 
the society. Their spirit and ideals are far ahead of the so-
ciety. Those who do succeed in getting higher educations 
are graduated into an environment where there are insuffi-
cient opportunities for realizing their knowledge and ex-
pectations. The result is bitter resentment against the es-
tablishments surrounding them. The government, the 
young believe, has failed them. So they demand reforms, 
or they try to turn the villains out. The revolt of the stu-
dents against the government is not, therefore, a class rev-
olution. It is a sheer outburst of frustration and a manifes-
tation of the fury of the frustrated youth. 
Thirdly, the military seems to have the best opportunity 
to be drawn into domestic politics to correct the wrongs of 
civilian institutions. The political role of the military is en-
hanced by the fact that it has efficient organization, mobil-
ity, professional experience of leadership, Westernization, 
mastery of modern technology, the monopoly and control 
of armed violence, etc. Hence, the army comes closest 
to the ideal of a modernized, elite organization in Asia. 
The military of Asian states are, therefore, more politi-
cized than their Western counterparts, and they may even 
produce a cadre of political activities. The garrison-state 
model as offered by J anowitz ( 1964) seems to be the best 
suitable model for describing the political role of the mili-
tary in Asia . In any case, the domination of politics by the 
military seems to be the end result of the ascent to power 
of the military elite under the conditions of prolonged cor-
• Cf .. Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Develop-
ment of the New States." World Politics, XII, No. 3 (April, 
I 960) , 329- 368; and Harry J. Benda, "Non-Western Intelligent-
sias as Political Elites," The A.11stralian Journal of Politics- and 
History, YI, No. 2 (November, 1960) , 205-218 . 
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ruption of a society. As Brecher (1963: 68) succinctly 
stated, 
the military rose to power on the crest of a wave of 
despair - despair with civili an government in general 
and democracy in particular. Much had been prom-
ised by the nationalist politicians and relatively little 
had been achieved. The spectacle of corruption am! 
inefficiency did not endear democracy to those who 
pondered the future, either the middle class or the 
army. But the latter had distinct assets. 
Asian circumstances encourage an extension of the 
tasks and power of military leaderships and actually force 
such trends. 
Finally, it is American foreign policy toward Asia that 
set the stage for military ascendancy in Asia . In many 
states in Asia, the provision of American arms did little to 
give the populace confidence in the recognized govern-
ment; the military build-up was sometimes conducive to 
the growth of the internal disruptions of a nation; and the 
resultant imbalance between the armament and the virtue 
of the ruling regimes put the enemy at vantage. If U. S. 
foreign policy toward the new states in Asia is centered 
~1erely on the military build-up as a means of bringing 
forth fresh political approaches in Asia , such foreign policy 
is militarily foolish , politically unsound, economically dis-
astrous, and morally questionable. For the main problems 
that U.S. policy confronts in Asia are not military but po-
litical, economic, and perhaps most important of all, psy-
chological. 
Democracy cannot be imposed upon the people in 
Asia at gun point. The United States should inspire the 
confidence of these people in American motives, goals, 
and her posture toward Asian affairs . To the people who 
have revolutionary potential and international aspira-
tions, it is very likely that U. S. feeling of pride in her 
own achievement in these areas looks and sounds like 
arrogance, and that U. S. tactics of military pressure or 
financial hand-outs as the means of coercing Asians into 
our political influence invites their hostility toward and 
suspicion of this country. Therefore, the United States 
should win her victory in Asia through proving the ad-
vantages of democracy to the people. Of course, it is a 
tremendous and painstaking task. Yet, it is what our 
country should face if we want to have the edge over a 
totalitarian enemy capable of wielding its enormous hu-
man and national resources as a unified force. Also the 
United States should be able to convince the people of 
Asia that we are genuinely interested in them . The worst 
possible blunder this country may commit in her foreign 
policy in these new nations of Asia is to give them an 
impression that they are looked down upon as beggars, 
rather than as friends, by the United States. "We (Amer-
icans) must learn to identify and deal with Asian prob-
lems in Asian terms, not solely in terms of our own ex-
periences" (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1959, Study No. 5: 
27). 
It is therefore necessary that a reassessment of U. S. 
policy in Asia be made. The adaptation of American 
policy toward Asian states must be based on a thorough 
152 
understanding of the attitudes of "Nefos" toward "O]d-
fos." In the absence of native skills, the result of the 
transplantation of technology alone will not bring ad-
vancement to the country; it will bring the effective loss 
of its political power. Although it has been improved 
recently, the traditional U. S. policy in Asia has been 
based to a considerable degree on improvisation, and no 
adequate capacities both for limited conventional war 
and for local guerrilla wa r has been fully developed. As 
a resul't, this country has confronted difficulties both in 
~djustin¥ _her policy to Asian revolutionary process and 
in exe rcising her leadership. 
Perhaps the policy of the United States in Asia should 
be directed to finding means to contribute to the political 
education of these countries rather than to the condem-
nation of their present situations. U. S. diplomacy must 
be capable of dealing more effectively with neutral and 
authoritarian governments. It is very important for the 
United States to get in touch with every element of real 
power, especially potential political comers for the 
"next" governments in Asian countries, because the span 
of life of the incumbent political executives is frequently 
shortened by the instability of the new states. In fact 
political upheaval of politicians fluctuates like a yo-yo'. 
In many cases the "ins" are already halfway on their way 
out. It is also vital to the interest of this country that the 
United States support programs rather than regimes . The 
major difficulty of U. S. policy comes quite often from 
supporting "shadow projects" that are designed primarily 
to benefit groups in power. An emphasis on a few long-
term programs of major significance, rather than a host 
of miscellaneous small projects, and an avoidance of 
touchy issues (e.g., national sovereignty, domestic de-
cisions, etc.) are highly desirable . It is also wise for this 
country to work through multilateral organizations and 
nonpolitical organizations, such as private or interna-
tional agencies, in the developing nations in Asia (see 
U.S. Congress, Senate 1959, Study No. 6). 
Since no nation in the Orient has escaped nationalist 
ferment , nationalism may still prove what Rcischauer 
( i 9 5 5: 269) referred to as " the nuclear weapon of the 
situation in Asia." Asian nationalism has challenoed 
\ 
J ."" \ estern democracy and been wooed by communism, 
and it has been attracted by neutralism. In Asia, the 
long-term presence of Colonial rulers makes it possible 
that leftist ideologies are identified with nationalism. In 
reaiity, nationalism in Asia is more the reflection of anti-
foreign and antiminority sentiments than of a widespread 
sense of national unity. Nationalism is often a reaction 
against a status of inferiority and an urge toward self 
respect, power, and control of one's own destiny. By 
espousing the cause of nationalism, communism has won 
a great asset. The search for national identity and per-
sonality frequently favors the fortunes of communism. 
Communism will appeal to Asian people so long as they 
face population explosions, primitive industrialization, 
and all their consequent miseries. Nationalism in Asia is 
also closely related to neutralism. The political nonalign-
ment policy of Asian states is the crystallization of the 
consideration of such factors as domestic pressures, geo-
The Minnesota Academy of Science 
graphic locations, and the tradition of nationalistic move-
ments in the individual nations. To find a modus vivandi 
with both the United States and the Soviet Union without 
antagonizing either seems to be advantageous for the 
emerging nations in Asia . Generally, nationalism, as a 
vital force in striving to build nation-state, is constructive 
when it contributes to the development of a single system 
of central authority and the institutionalization of ration-
alistic values. As a political force, nationalism may drive 
Asian nations to achieve the double end of becoming 
modernized and at the same time retaining their own cul-
tural heritages. However, nationalism is certainly de-
structive and dangerous if it is controlled by narrow 
racism, bigotry, and disapproval of all foreign political 
systems, including democracy. 
Conclusion 
The problem Asia confronts today is therefore not the 
problem of the desirability of democracy but of its feas-
ibility. Democracy is desirable but it is not workable or 
sometimes unattainable, whereas authoritarianism is 
workable even if it may not be desirable. In a society in 
which the family rather than the individual has been a 
basic social unit, and the middle class cannot exert a 
stabilizing influence, democracy as a political system 
often results in social instability. With a paucity of per-
sonnel and technical equipment, democracy remains a 
borrowed ideology, whose implications are little under-
stood and whose institutions have no special significance. 
For instance, the loan of foreign experts or imports of 
technical assistance alone cannot solve the problems of 
the shortage of administrative organizations in the devel-
oping nations of Asia. To get out of their economic back-
wardness, the new nations of Asia lean more toward 
comprehensive state planning systems, and this planned 
economic development is very much sympathetic to 
either a totalitarian or an authoritarian government, 
which can enforce its policy by mobilizing the masses 
without open protests. 
By the same token, however, there are several dangers 
of authoritarianism in Asia. While authoritarian coercion 
may lead the society to a rapid modernization, the very 
reverse of this wishful effect may also arise. Since gov-
ernment controls all capital, all natural resources, and all 
labor, if it makes a mistake in the process of economic 
modernization, such a mistake cannot be checked in 
time and will result in a calamity, as was seen in the 
fate of the Chinese Great-Leap-Forward plan, and in the 
communal system in the Indonesian economic plan for 
heavy industry in lieu of light industry, although empha-
sis on the latter has the better chance of conserving capi-
tal and using the reservoir of idle man power. A sheer 
increase of pressure by a government cannot expedite 
modernization; rather, it will deprive the people of ini-
tiative and willingness. Political control is one thing and 
economic development is a completely different thing. 
Consequently, authoritarianism is not the permanent 
solution to the developmental problems of the Asians. 
Under the present circumstances, democracy seems to 
be losing its grip on Asian states and the vacuum thus 
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created invites dictatorial regimes in to defend the poor 
and the oppressed. At present, the Asian choice of po-
litical system ranges from democracy, to noncommunist 
authoritarianism, to communist dictatorship. Yet, it is 
interesting to note that all, despite the fact that democ-
racy looks like an illusion to them, have committed 
themselves to the principles of democracy, at least in 
their intentions. Most of them turned away from democ-
racy to embrace authoritarianism based on the practice 
of a party-state, or coerced election; of hand-picked leg-
islatures; of one-man rule, or judiciary under procurators' 
supervision; and of severe limitation of individual rights. 
Nontheless, their goal is to achieve the principle of repre-
sentative legislation, periodic secret, free elections; the 
rule of law, guarded by an independent judiciary; and 
individual rights well guaranteed. 
Democracy exists and has existed in a variety of cir-
cumstances, even if it is most commonly sustained by a 
limited cluster of conditions. It is not democracy that 
betrays Asian expectations but the Asian expectations 
that are too gigantic to be swallowed at one gulp by 
democracy. Under the present circumstances, the suc-
cess of democracy rather than its failure in Asia would 
be surprising. Nevertheless, we should not regard the 
frequent disparagement of democracy in Asia as a de-
feat. Present rejection of democracy in Asia does not 
necessarily mean that democracy will not be realized in 
the future. 
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Learned Societies Around the World 
Spain 
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Royal Spanish Arndemy of Language (Real Academia Espanola do la Lengua). 
Founded 1713. Devoted to cultivation of Spanish language and literature. Oldest 
and most important of the Spanish Academies. Organizes literary competitions. 
Publications : Dictionary of the Spanish language; Spanish grammar; editions of 
classical writers (Cervantes). 
Royal Academy of Fine Arts of San Fernando (Real Academia de Bellas Artes 
de San Fernando). Founded 1744. 
Royal Academy of Medicine (Real Academia de Medicina). Founded 1773 . 
Royal Academy of Legislation and Jurisprudence (Real Academia de Legis-
lacion y Jurisprudencia). Founded 1826. 
Royal A cademy of Natural, Physical and Exact Sciences (Real Academia de 
Ciencias Exactas, Fisicas y N aturales). Founded 184 7. 
Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences (Real Academia de Ciencias 
Morales y Politicas). Founded 1857. 
Royal Academy of Pharmacy (Real Academia da Farmacia). Founded 1932. 
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